Securing Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace for a Small Team
Both suites ship with defaults built for getting started, not for staying secure. The settings a small team should change, and the order to change them in.

Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace are both configured, out of the box, to make the first week easy. Mail flows, files share, people sign in from anywhere on anything. That is a reasonable set of defaults for a trial and a poor one for a business holding client data two years later. Almost nobody goes back and changes them, because the suite works and nothing visibly needs fixing.
What follows is the short list of changes that actually move the needle for a team of five to fifty, roughly in order of value per minute spent. Both suites can do all of it on standard business plans.
First: make the sign-in hard to steal
Enforce multi-factor authentication for everyone. Not "enabled and encouraged". Enforced, with a deadline, including the owner and including the person who finds it annoying. An account with a password alone is one convincing login page away from being someone else's. If you do nothing else here, do this. The practical steps for a small team are in enforcing two-step verification.
Use the strongest second factor your people will actually use. Passkeys and hardware security keys resist the fake-login-page attacks that defeat codes, and the gap matters most for administrators. Text message codes are better than nothing and the weakest of the options; prefer an authenticator app at minimum. See security keys.
Block legacy authentication. Old mail protocols such as IMAP, POP and basic authentication cannot present a second factor, so an attacker who has a password can sometimes sign in through them and skip MFA entirely. Both suites let you switch these off. Check first whether an old scanner or line-of-business app depends on one, and if so, restrict it to that one account rather than leaving the door open for all.
Second: fix the mailbox settings attackers rely on
Once someone has access to a mailbox, their priority is keeping it. Two settings decide how easy that is.
Block automatic forwarding to external addresses. A forwarding rule is the classic persistence trick: it survives a password reset, it is invisible to the mailbox owner, and it quietly delivers every invoice and password reset to the attacker. Both suites allow you to disable external auto-forwarding by default and permit it only where a business reason exists. Also look for hidden inbox rules that move messages to obscure folders, which is covered in malicious email rules.
Turn on audit logging now. Logs are retroactively useless. If you enable them after noticing something wrong, the period you need to examine contains nothing. Both platforms log sign-ins, admin changes, rule creation and file access, and CISA publishes detailed guidance on which Microsoft 365 logs to collect and why. You do not need to read them daily. You need them to exist.
Switch on the alerts that are worth reading. Keep this short or it becomes noise everyone ignores. Suspicious sign-in location, new administrator added, new forwarding rule created, large volume of file downloads. Four alerts you act on beat forty you filter.
Third: tidy the roles and the sharing
Separate admin accounts from everyday accounts. The person who administers the tenant should do admin work from a dedicated account and read email from a normal one. Phishing lands in the mailbox, and you do not want it landing in the session that can change everything. More in administrator account security.
Use narrower built-in roles. Both suites ship roles for user management, help desk and billing. Most people who currently hold full admin need one of those, which is the least privilege principle applied to the one place it pays off fastest.
Change the external sharing default. The riskiest setting in most small tenants is a document library where the default share is "anyone with the link". Set the default to named people, make anonymous links expire, and decide deliberately which areas can be shared externally at all. Client folders and HR folders are usually not among them.
Restrict who can connect third-party apps. When a user authorizes an app to read their mail or files, those permissions persist independently of the password. Limit self-service app consent, then review the connected app list periodically and revoke what nobody recognizes.
Fourth: protect the domain and the data
Set up SPF, DKIM and DMARC. These stop other people sending mail that appears to come from your domain, which protects your customers and your suppliers more than it protects you. Start DMARC in monitoring mode, read the reports, then move to enforcement. See email authentication explained.
Understand what the suite does and does not keep. Both have a deleted-items retention period and then the data is gone. If a mailbox is deleted or a ransomware incident encrypts synced files, the recycle bin is not a backup. Decide whether you need a separate backup of cloud data, and if you do, test restoring something from it.
Decide on device rules. At minimum, require a screen lock and encryption on anything with your mail on it, and make sure you can remotely wipe work data from a lost phone. Personal phones need their own agreement, which is what bring your own device rules is about.
A sensible order of work
- Enforce MFA for everyone, administrators first and with the strongest factor available.
- Block external auto-forwarding and audit existing inbox rules.
- Turn on audit logging and four useful alerts.
- Cut full administrators to two or three with separate admin accounts.
- Block legacy authentication.
- Change the external sharing default and restrict app consent.
- Configure SPF, DKIM and DMARC.
- Write down what you changed, so the next person knows.
That last step gets skipped and it is the one that makes the work survive a change of staff or supplier. If an outside firm manages your tenant, these settings are a fair thing to ask them about directly, and whether you need an IT provider covers what to expect from that relationship.
Unsure about a sign-in alert or a sharing notification? Paste the message into CyberWatch AI Scan for a free check.
None of these changes require new products. They require an afternoon in the admin console and a decision to stop treating the trial configuration as permanent. For everything around them, see protecting small businesses from digital threats.
Frequently asked questions
What is the single most important setting to change?
Enforced multi-factor authentication for every account, with no exceptions and no opt-out. Nothing else on the list comes close for the effort involved.
Do I need the expensive subscription tier to be secure?
No. Enforced MFA, admin role separation, audit logging, external forwarding controls and sharing defaults are available on standard business plans. Higher tiers add conditional access and device management, which are useful but not the foundation.
Why does automatic email forwarding matter so much?
It is how an attacker keeps reading your mail after you have changed the password. A forwarding rule survives a password reset, and almost nobody checks for one. Block external auto-forwarding by default.
Should I turn off external file sharing?
Usually not off, but not wide open either. Set the default to specific named people rather than anyone with the link, and switch off anonymous links that never expire.
What is legacy authentication and should I block it?
Older mail protocols that cannot present a second factor, so they bypass MFA entirely. Block them unless you have found something that genuinely needs one, in which case restrict it to that single account.
Is audit logging worth enabling before anything has gone wrong?
Yes, because logs only cover the period after you turn them on. If you enable logging during an incident, the week you most need to see has no data in it.
How do I handle connected third-party apps?
Restrict which apps users can authorize themselves, review the connected app list periodically, and revoke anything nobody recognizes. App consent is a real attack route, not a housekeeping chore.
Does the built-in security score tell me enough?
It is a useful prompt and a poor target. It rewards some changes that will not matter in your environment and cannot see the processes around your accounts. Read it as a to-do list to filter, not a grade.
Sources
- Secure Cloud Business Applications (SCuBA) Project, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
- Microsoft Expanded Cloud Logs Implementation Playbook, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
- Security checklists, Google Workspace Admin Help
- Multi-factor authentication for your corporate online services, UK National Cyber Security Centre
- Cloud security guidance, UK National Cyber Security Centre
- Microsoft Entra Conditional Access, Microsoft Learn
- Modify Authentication Process, Technique T1556, MITRE ATT&CK
- Logging and monitoring, UK National Cyber Security Centre


