Construction payment fraud: fake subcontractors, inflated valuations and the long payment chain
Construction pays large sums against work nobody can re-measure later. The schemes that exploit it, from ghost labor to retention theft, and what stops them.

There is a specific moment on a building site when fraud becomes almost impossible to prove. It is when the plasterboard goes up, or the screed goes down, or the trench is backfilled. Whatever was claimed for underneath is now a matter of record rather than observation, and the record is a valuation signed off weeks earlier by somebody who has since moved to another project.
Construction is exposed to payment fraud for structural reasons rather than cultural ones. Money is released progressively against judgments of progress, not against deliverable items. The payment chain runs through subcontractors, sub-subcontractors and labor agencies the ultimate payer never meets. Materials arrive and leave continuously. The workforce changes weekly. And the commercial reality of the industry is that nobody wants to be the person who stopped a payment and stopped the job.
Most writing on business fraud concentrates on a redirected bank transfer, which construction suffers from too. The schemes below are the ones peculiar to how construction actually pays for things.
The valuation is the control, and the control is a judgment
On a measured contract, a subcontractor submits an application stating what proportion of each work package is complete. A quantity surveyor or project manager assesses it, certifies a figure, and that figure is paid. Everything downstream, including every approval your finance function performs, accepts the certified figure as correct.
Inflated valuation is therefore the central construction fraud. It does not require a forged document, a fake company or a compromised mailbox. It requires an application that overstates progress and an assessor who is too stretched, too junior, too trusting or too complicit to challenge it. The overstatement is then recovered in later valuations if the job runs to plan, which is what makes it so hard to characterize: a subcontractor who claims eighty percent when sixty is done may be committing fraud or may be managing cash flow, and the difference lies in intent.
Where it becomes unambiguous is on a project that fails. If a subcontractor becomes insolvent having been paid ahead of progress, the overpayment is unrecoverable, and whoever certified it has a problem. Variations and change orders amplify this, because they are priced under time pressure, often verbally agreed on site, and documented afterwards by the party that benefits from them.
The practical defense is evidence rather than suspicion. Photographic records at each valuation, dated and tied to the specific application, plus measured records for work that will be covered, change the question from whose word to which record. They are also what makes a later recovery claim viable.
Labor and time
Ghost labor is billing for people who were not there. On a site with several hundred operatives across a dozen subcontractors and a labor agency or two, no single party holds a reliable attendance list, and the one who bills you is the one who tells you who attended.
The variants are familiar from occupational fraud research in other sectors, here applied to a daywork sheet: names that do not correspond to a real worker, hours extended beyond the shift, overtime at premium rates for periods when the site was closed, and the same operative billed by two subcontractors on the same day. Where supervisors sign daywork sheets without independent attendance data, the sheet is simply a claim.
Access control systems and biometric turnstiles are usually justified on safety grounds, which is the right reason to install them, and they happen to be the strongest anti-fraud control available on a large site because they produce attendance data the biller does not control. Where that is disproportionate, periodic unannounced headcounts reconciled against the previous week's daywork sheets achieve a useful fraction of the same thing.
Materials
Materials fraud divides into two patterns. The first is billing for materials never delivered, which is defeated by matching invoices to delivery notes signed by somebody other than the person who ordered them. The second is diversion of materials that were delivered, to another site, to a private job, or straight back out of the gate. Open-ended supply accounts, where a subcontractor can draw materials against a project code without a purchase order, are the easiest arrangement on site to abuse and remain common because they are convenient.
The crossover with duplicate billing matters here. Construction is one of the categories where duplicate invoicing concentrates, because the sheer volume of small invoices from the same suppliers against the same project codes defeats both memory and exact-match duplicate checks.
Retention, the forgotten money
Retention is a percentage withheld from each payment and released after practical completion, sometimes years later. By then the project team has dispersed, the site office has gone, and the records sit in an archive.
That makes retention release an unusually attractive target. A claim arrives for a subcontractor from a job that finished two years ago, with bank details that have changed, and the person processing it has no knowledge of the project and nobody to ask. Some of these are genuine subcontractors whose banking has legitimately changed. Some are fraudsters who identified a dormant liability from public project records.
Retention releases should be subject to the same verification as any first payment to a new account, and the verification should go to a contact established during the project rather than one supplied with the claim. Keeping a retention register with named contacts recorded at completion costs nothing and answers the question years later.
The external attack: bank details in the payment chain
Alongside the internal schemes, construction suffers heavily from ordinary payment redirection, and it suffers more than most industries because of volume. A main contractor may process hundreds of subcontractor applications a month, each with its own bank details, from companies it has limited visibility of.
The attack is the business email compromise pattern described in supplier and vendor impersonation fraud: a message changing payment details, sent either from a compromised subcontractor mailbox or from a lookalike domain. What is specific to construction is that the chain gives an attacker many weaker links to choose from. A small groundworks firm with one shared mailbox and no multi-factor authentication is far easier to compromise than the main contractor, and a payment instruction from that firm is entirely expected.
Three controls carry most of the weight. Bank details for a subcontractor are set once at onboarding and changed only after a call to a number from the contract, placed by someone who did not receive the request. Account name verification is run on every new or changed account where the service exists. And any application for payment that arrives with a change of bank details is treated as two separate items, so the payment can proceed to the known account while the change is verified. That last point matters commercially, because it removes the argument that verification delays the job.
The structural version of this problem, where a fabricated subcontractor is onboarded in the first place, is covered in fake supplier onboarding, and it is worth noting that construction is where it is easiest, since a new company with no trading history is entirely normal in the sector.
Payment application with new bank details? Paste the message into CyberWatch AI Scan for a free check, then confirm by telephone on a number from the subcontract.
Where the commercial function and the finance function must meet
The recurring failure in construction is that fraud risk sits across two teams who do not share a view of it. The commercial team owns valuations, variations and subcontractor relationships. The finance team owns payment, bank details and the supplier record. Each assumes the other is checking the thing it does not see.
A fabricated subcontractor passes because commercial accepted it as a legitimate new trade and finance accepted it as a legitimate new supplier. An inflated valuation passes because finance paid a certified figure and commercial certified under pressure. Closing that gap does not require a new system. It requires a monthly conversation with a short agenda: new subcontractors added this month, bank detail changes processed, valuations where the certified figure differed materially from the application, retention releases paid, and material supply accounts without purchase orders.
Two other things are worth building in. First, check the companies. Pulling the public register entry for every new subcontractor takes minutes and surfaces entities incorporated last month with a director who appears across several of your other subcontractors. The habits in how to check if a company is real transfer directly. Second, make it safe for site staff to raise something. The person best placed to notice that a claimed crew of twelve was actually four is a site engineer who will say nothing if raising it is treated as disloyalty, which is why how reports are received matters more than how they are invited.
If money has already gone to an account you now doubt, the banking recall window is short and does not wait for the commercial argument to resolve. Start the sequence in what to do when a business payment goes to a fraudster immediately, and keep the question of whether the subcontractor was fictitious or merely compromised as a separate strand of work.
Frequently asked questions
Why is construction more exposed than other industries?
Because work is paid for progressively against measurements that cannot be re-checked once covered up, through a chain of subcontractors the main payer never meets, on sites where materials and labor arrive and leave constantly.
What is a false or inflated valuation?
A claim for a stage of work that overstates how much has been completed. It is the central construction fraud because the money is released against a judgment of progress rather than against a delivered item.
What is ghost labor?
Billing for workers who were never on site, or for more hours than were worked. On a large site with high turnover and subcontracted crews, nobody holds a reliable list of who was present.
How does fraud reach the retention money?
Retention is held for months or years after practical completion, by which time the project team has dispersed. A fraudster submits a release claim for a subcontractor whose details have been changed, and there is often nobody left who remembers the job.
What is the most common external attack?
Bank detail changes on subcontractor payment applications, sent from compromised or lookalike email. The long chain of parties and the volume of applications make it hard to verify each one.
Does a main contractor carry the risk for the whole chain?
Commercially it usually does, because paying the wrong account does not discharge the obligation to the real subcontractor. That is why verification cannot be delegated down the chain.
What single control helps most?
Photographic and measured records of work at each valuation, tied to the application that claimed it. It makes inflated claims provable later, which is when most of them are discovered.
How should materials deliveries be controlled?
Deliveries should be received against a purchase order by somebody who is not the person who ordered them, with the delivery note matched to the invoice. Open-ended material supply accounts without that match are the easiest thing on site to abuse.
Sources
- Report to the Nations: occupational fraud research, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
- Business Email Compromise: The $50 Billion Scam, FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center
- Internet Crime Report 2024, FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center
- White-Collar Crime, FBI
- Fraud 101: What is fraud?, Association of Certified Fraud Examiners
- Supply chain security guidance, UK National Cyber Security Centre
- Cyber security for small organisations, UK National Cyber Security Centre
- Find and update company information, Companies House, UK Government


