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A Backup Strategy a Small Business Will Actually Keep To

Most small businesses have something they call a backup. Fewer have one that would survive ransomware. Here is a backup strategy you can set up in a week and keep.

CyberWatch AI3 November 2026 · 7 min read
An external hard drive connected to a laptop on a wooden desk

A pattern repeats itself in ransomware cases at small firms. The business did have backups. A drive sat under the desk, or a network storage box blinked away in the cupboard, and someone had set it up properly two years earlier. Then the attacker arrived, and because that drive was mapped as Z: on the office PC, the backup was encrypted along with everything else. The business had been backing up diligently into the blast radius.

A backup strategy is not a product you buy. It is a short set of decisions about what gets copied, where the copies sit, how far back they go, and who checks. Once those decisions are written down, the technology is the easy part.

Start from the four ways you lose data

Most backup plans fail because they were designed against one threat. Design against all four and the plan comes out differently.

  • Hardware dies. A laptop SSD fails, a phone goes in a river. Any copy anywhere solves this, which is why it is the one everybody plans for.
  • Someone deletes or overwrites something. A staff member saves over the master price list, or clears out a folder that turned out to matter. You need yesterday's version, not today's copy.
  • Ransomware. The attacker encrypts live data and goes hunting for backups first, because a business with working backups does not pay. Anything reachable from a compromised machine with normal credentials is at risk.
  • An account is taken over. If your Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace admin account is compromised, the attacker can delete mailboxes, wipe shared drives and turn off retention. Cloud redundancy does not help, because the provider is faithfully carrying out instructions from your admin.

Hardware failure needs a copy. Deletion needs history. Ransomware needs a copy the attacker cannot reach. Account takeover needs a copy outside the account.

Sync is not backup

This is the most common and most expensive misunderstanding. OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox and SharePoint are sync services. Their job is to make the cloud copy match the local copy as fast as possible. When a file is encrypted or corrupted or deleted on a laptop, that change is replicated upward, correctly and quickly.

The version history and recycle bin in those services will rescue one file someone overwrote on Tuesday. They are not built for restoring forty thousand files to a point in time after an incident, retention windows are short, and in some configurations an administrator can purge them. Treat sync as convenience and collaboration. Back it up separately.

The 3-2-1 rule, in a form that fits ten people

Three copies of your data, on two different types of storage, with one copy off-site or offline. For a small business that usually looks like this:

  1. The live copy. Your Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace tenancy, your accounting software, your file server if you still have one.
  2. A cloud backup of that live copy, from a different vendor. A third-party backup service for Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, protecting mail, calendars, contacts, OneDrive and SharePoint or Drive. This is what saves you from deletion, retention changes and admin compromise. It costs a few dollars per user per month.
  3. An offline copy. Two encrypted external drives on rotation. One is plugged in, written to, unplugged and taken off the premises. The other comes back next time. Unplugged is the point. A drive that is never connected cannot be encrypted by malware or deleted by a stolen admin password.

If you still run a physical server, add image-based backup of that server to the second tier, so you can rebuild the machine rather than reinstalling it from memory.

Decide what actually needs backing up

Do not try to back up everything. Ask a sharper question: what would stop us trading on Monday morning? For most small firms the honest list is short.

  • Accounting and payroll data, including anything held only inside a desktop package
  • Email and calendars, which usually hold the only record of what was agreed with whom
  • Customer records and the CRM, or the spreadsheet playing the part of a CRM
  • Contracts, certificates, insurance documents and licences
  • Current project work and designs
  • The website, and the configuration that makes it work
  • Credentials and recovery codes, which belong in a password manager with its own export, not in a document

Write that list on one page, note where each item lives, and note which tier backs it up. Nearly every gap found in a real incident is something that was never on anybody's list. Cloud-only applications are the usual offenders, because people assume the vendor is backing up on their behalf. Check the vendor's actual retention terms, and if the answer is thin, schedule a monthly export.

Retention: how far back you can go

A seven-day backup window is a trap. Ransomware operators frequently spend weeks inside a network before triggering encryption, and quiet data corruption can go unnoticed for longer. If your oldest backup is seven days old, every copy you hold may already contain the problem.

A workable default for a small business: daily backups kept for 30 days, weekly backups kept for 90 days, and a monthly copy kept for a year. Many backup services do this by default if you leave the retention settings alone, so check rather than assume. Where you hold personal data, keeping backups indefinitely creates its own obligations, so align retention with the rest of your data policy.

Make one copy genuinely unreachable

Everything else in this article is normal good practice. This is the part that decides whether a ransomware incident is a bad fortnight or the end of the business.

You have two realistic ways to get an unreachable copy. The first is physical: an encrypted external drive that spends most of its life disconnected and off-site. The second is immutability, sometimes sold as object lock or a retention lock, where the backup service refuses to alter or delete data for a set number of days regardless of who asks. If your backup provider offers immutability, turn it on. If it does not, that is a reason to look at a different provider.

Also check who can log into the backup console. It should be a separate account with its own password and two-step verification, not your main email account, and not a credential saved in the browser of the office PC. Attackers look for the backup console early, and an attacker who can log in can often delete the lot without touching a single encrypted file.

The routine that makes it stick

Name one person as the backup owner and one as deputy. Then keep the recurring work small enough to survive a busy month:

  • Weekly, ten minutes. Open the backup dashboard. Check that every job ran, read any warnings, swap the external drive.
  • Monthly, thirty minutes. Restore something real. A mailbox folder, a project directory, a database. Note how long it took. See testing that your backups actually restore, because an untested backup is a hope rather than a control.
  • Quarterly, one hour. Re-read your one-page list. New system, new supplier, new shared drive? Add it. Remove what you no longer hold.

Turn on email alerts for failed jobs, then make sure those alerts go to a person rather than a shared inbox nobody reads. A silent failure that persists for three months is the most common way a well-designed backup plan quietly stops working.

Write down your recovery expectations. Two numbers: how much data you can afford to lose, measured in hours, and how long you can afford to be down. Those two numbers decide your backup frequency and your restore method, and they are a far more useful conversation with a supplier than asking what they recommend.

Mistakes worth avoiding

A few that turn up repeatedly in small businesses: backing up to a drive that is permanently connected and mapped; relying on a single backup set with no second copy; backing up the server but not the laptops where half the real work lives; storing the only copy of the backup encryption key in the system being backed up; and letting the person who set it all up leave without documenting any of it.

One more, less obvious: never testing a restore onto different hardware. If your recovery plan depends on the exact machine that just died, it is not a plan.

Got a message that looks like it is phishing for your credentials? Paste it into CyberWatch AI Scan for a free check before anyone clicks.

Where to start this week

Write the one-page list of what matters. Buy a third-party cloud backup for your email and file platform. Buy two external drives and start the rotation. Put one monthly restore test in the calendar. That is a backup strategy, and it is achievable inside a week for less than the cost of a single day of downtime.

For the fuller technical picture see our guide to backup and recovery, and for how ransomware reaches a small network in the first place see how ransomware gets in. If budget is the constraint, security on a small budget sets out what to buy first, and a short risk review will tell you whether backups are in fact your biggest gap. Everything here sits inside our complete guide to small business cybersecurity.

Frequently asked questions

What is the 3-2-1 backup rule?

Three copies of your data, on two different kinds of storage, with one copy kept off-site or offline. The point is that no single event destroys every copy at once.

Is OneDrive or Google Drive a backup?

No. Those are sync services. If a file is encrypted, deleted or corrupted on your laptop, the damaged version syncs to the cloud. Version history helps for a single file, but it is not designed for recovering thousands of files after an incident.

How often should a small business back up?

Daily for anything you type into during the working day, such as accounts, email and shared files. Anything less frequent means deciding in advance that you can afford to retype a day's work.

How long should we keep backups?

At least 30 days, and ideally 90 for your most important data. Ransomware and quiet data corruption are often discovered weeks after they start, and a 7-day retention window may only hold already-damaged copies.

Do we need a backup if everything is in the cloud?

Yes. Cloud providers protect their own infrastructure, not you from a deleted mailbox, a compromised admin account or a mistaken bulk change. Most providers keep deleted items for a limited window only.

What is an immutable backup?

A backup that cannot be changed or deleted for a set period, even by an administrator. It is the single most useful protection against ransomware operators who go looking for your backups before encrypting anything.

How much should backup cost a 10-person business?

Usually tens of dollars a month for cloud backup of mailboxes and files, plus a one-off cost for a couple of external drives. The expensive version is the one you buy after an incident.

Who should own backups in a small business?

One named person, with a named deputy. If backups are everyone's job they are nobody's job, and the gap only shows up on the day you need a restore.

Sources

  1. #StopRansomware Guide, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
  2. Backing up your data, UK National Cyber Security Centre
  3. Offline backups in an online world, UK National Cyber Security Centre
  4. SP 800-34 Rev. 1, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems, US National Institute of Standards and Technology
  5. Small Business Cybersecurity Corner, US National Institute of Standards and Technology
  6. StopRansomware.gov, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
  7. Cyber Essentials, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
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